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Abstract
Digital Triage is the initial, rapid screening of electronic devices as a precursor to full forensic analysis. Triage
has numerous benefits including resource prioritisation, greater involvement of criminal investigators and the
rapid provision of initial outcomes. In traditional scientific forensics and criminology, certain behavioural
attributes and character traits can be identified and used to construct a case profile to focus an investigation and
narrow down a list of suspects. This research introduces the Triage Modelling Tool (TMT), that uses a profiling
approach to identify how offenders utilise and structure files through the creation of file system models. Results
from the TMT have proven to be extremely promising when compared to Encase’s similar in-built functionality,
which provides a strong justification for future work within this area.
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INTRODUCTION
Digital forensics is ultimately utilised to identify certain characteristics (Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, Wedge, &
Debrota, 2006) or items of evidence (McKemmish, 1999; Rogers et al., 2006) from the devices of offenders.
However, the abundance of devices and large amounts of data that belong to any one individual has increased to
the point where effective and timely digital forensic analysis has become almost an insurmountable task
(Roussev, Quates, & Martell, 2013). The solution to this problem is digital triage – a rapid, initial screen of
potential target devices in order to assess their relative investigative worth (Roussev et al., 2013). In traditional
scientific forensics and criminology, certain behavioural attributes and character traits can be identified and used
to construct a case profile to focus an investigation and narrow down a list of suspects (Rogers, 2003). In the
same way that case profiles can be developed for real-world criminal activities, the magnitude of the digital
footprint offenders often leave on digital devices can also be used to create accurate and effective case profiles.
The majority of profiling techniques currently utilised in digital forensic investigations adopt a deductive
approach (Cantrell, Dampier, Dandass, Niu, & Bogen, 2012; Rogers et al., 2006). By developing an
understanding of how users structure their file system on personal computers to facilitate their real-world
criminal activities, inductive profiling techniques can be used to correlate the file systems of unknown computer
systems to pre-established crime templates. This work seeks to address this through the development of a proofof-concept tool chain that integrates with a commercial tool. This research is the first stage of a larger research
project and will be used to generate data for future supervised learning systems.

BACKGROUND
Digital forensics is a relatively new field of research that was only formalised in the late 1990’s (McKemmish,
1999; Pollitt, Noblett, & Presley, 2000). However due to the cultural trend of the rapidly increasing complexity
and pervasiveness of technology, the increasing amount of data that can be extracted from digital devices is
resulting in increasingly large forensic laboratory backlogs (Horsman, Laing, & Vickers, 2014). This is as a
direct result from the number of criminal investigations that benefit from digital evidence, the number of devices
an individual may own that could potentially hold evidentiary value and the increasing size and complexity of
each device from an analysis perspective (Turnbull, Taylor, & Blundell, 2009). The increase in time required for
digital forensic analysis causes delays in time critical cases where digital evidence may be crucial to providing a
timely resolution for law enforcement officials and in the judicial process. Digital triage, a subset of digital
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forensics, was introduced to alleviate these issues by providing “a fast, initial screen of potential investigative
targets in order to estimate their evidentiary value” (Roussev et al., 2013).
The key difference between digital forensic analysis and digital triage is the intended purpose of the investigative
process. Although both digital forensic investigation and triage require the maintenance of evidentiary integrity,
their aims differ. Digital forensic analysis is more concerned with determining a complete understanding of what
has occurred on a computing device whereas the purpose of digital triage is to evaluate the evidentiary value
related to an investigation in a timely manner (Cantrell et al., 2012; USDOJ, 2001). Digital triage can be used to
gather information at a crime scene during initial search and seizure, providing time sensitive leads and a
‘psychological advantage’ for investigators when interviewing suspects (Rogers et al., 2006). In addition, it can
also be used to prioritise devices submitted for forensic analysis to reduce case backlogs (Cantrell et al., 2012).
Investigator-led triage (also known as administrative triage) is also a legitimate use of triage, allowing criminal
investigators, with their deep knowledge of the case at hand to extract specific documents or prioritise full
analysis as required (Shaw & Browne, 2013). On the other hand, technical triage refers to the software and
hardware tools utilised to extract information from a device (Shaw & Browne, 2013).
There is no one solution for digital triage that is appropriate for all circumstances. As each case is inherently
unique, different tools and techniques will yield different results. One technique commonly utilised in numerous
triage models and in other areas of criminology is profiling. Profiling has proven to be an effective technique in
criminal investigations and has roots tracing back to the ‘Jack the Ripper’ killings of the 19 th Century (Rogers,
2003). Profiling has two forms: deductive and inductive. Deductive profiling is conducted after the offence and
uses evidence to construct a behaviour profile for a particular case (Rogers, 2003), using specifics to build
generalisations about a suspect’s expected behaviours or character traits. Inductive profiling draws on the
characteristics of previous offenders to build evolutionary offender type profiles that can be applied to a larger
population. This narrows down a list of subjects into a reduced subset of more probable offenders (Nykodym,
Taylor, & Vilela, 2005).

RELATED WORK
Digital triage is a cost benefit analysis, maximising investigative outputs whilst minimising the time and
resources required to analyse devices (Shaw & Browne, 2013). This approach is almost a subconscious action
taken in criminal investigations, as resources are finite and time always works against the investigator or analyst.
Digital profiling and technical triage methods are relatively new areas of research within digital forensics. The
benefits of digital profiling were only formally explored in 2003 (Rogers, 2003), with later work solidifying the
benefits criminal profiling could provide (Nykodym et al., 2005). Arguably, the use of deductive profiling from
the information gathered through digital forensics had already been occurring for a number of years; Pollitt’s
previous work in computer forensics for the Federal Bureau of Investigation produced information that was
incorporated into the traditional investigative process (Pollitt et al., 2000).
The first methodology to formally apply digital profiling within a triage framework was the Computer Field
Forensics Triage Process Model (CFFTPM) (Rogers et al., 2006). The CFFTPM has an initial planning and
triage phase that uses administrative triage to prioritise devices for analysis from case-specific information,
followed by three stages of technical triage to develop a comprehensive device profile (Rogers et al., 2006).
Holistically, these profiles are deductive in nature - they allow investigators to view the information rapidly
gathered from a device and use their own insight and expert opinion to infer logical generalisations from the
data. The CFFTPM is perhaps the most robust triage model that incorporates digital profiling and is one of the
few digital triage models presented from research (Jiang, Yang, Lin, Zhang, & Liu, 2015).
As a forensic examination technique, profiling is difficult to subvert. The inherently habitual nature of human
behaviour requires an offender to make a conscious effort to change their actions from those they are generally
comfortable with. This requires a considerable amount of thought; an analyst can use digital profiling to detect
commonalities during an investigation from a wide range of areas including, but not limited to: specific tools or
toolkits utilised, language of the offender and their contacts from communications, location data, file timestamps
or computer usage information (Foster & Liu, 2005).
Other triage approaches attempt to produce actionable intelligence by utilising automation with profiling. One
such technique is Five Minute Forensics (5MF), used to rapidly classify the category of a user for each device
analysed during a forensic investigation (Grillo, Lentini, Me, & Ottoni, 2009). Through minimal interaction with
the device and the forensically sound extraction of a small number of files, the 5MF technique attempts to
rapidly profile a user into one of five different user categories (Grillo et al., 2009).
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More recent research combines aspects of the CFFTPM and 5MF into a Semi-Automated, Digital Triage
Process Model (SADTPM) (Cantrell et al., 2012). Although case and evidence modelling have been identified as
areas where future research is needed, (Nance, Hay, & Bishop, 2009) there has been little work conducted into
the development of specific crime templates. The relative benefit that could be gained from this area is still yet to
be fully understood.
The use of automation to aid in the rapid categorisation of devices has not only been explored by the SADTPM,
with other work adopting a machine learning approach to classify digital media (Marturana & Tacconi, 2013).
Well suited to the laboratory environment, their methodology utilises a large feature set and a number of crimespecific variables to extract data from a device. This data is then processed into a reduced data subset,
normalised and the device classified using a binary categorisation on whether a plausible connection exists
between the device and the target crime. Although this research utilises a large crime-specific feature set for
analysis, these features are generally system-wide file statistics and the benefits from any type of profiling is
limited to the crime-specific feature set.
The Case-Based Reasoning Forensic Triager (CBR-FT) is another tool developed for digital triage that presents
a novel approach by locating evidence using generalised file system paths (Horsman et al., 2014). The CBR-FT
targets specific locations in a file system hierarchy that are most likely to contain evidentiary data and improves
its algorithm over time. This tool has merit in that it leverages off well tested and proven principles from
psychology of profiling human behaviour to increase the success rate of rapidly finding data in a digital triage
scenario (Horsman et al., 2014)
Each of these technical triage methods incorporate some form of categorisation, profiling or automated learning
technique to improve the precision and recall of data returned during an investigation. However, none of these
tools adequately model how an offender interacts with the underlying file system hierarchy and structure of a
device. The CBR-FT is perhaps the closest tool that uses inductive profiling principles and increases its
effectiveness over time, however, the tool is limited to generalised file system locations and can easily miss
evidence in deep file path locations or uncommon storage areas. Wherever an offender chooses to store
incriminating data, the structuring habits of that offender can be captured with the TFT through file system
model generation.
There is little work towards digital triage methods that employ an inductive profiling approach. This work seeks
to address this in-part through the introduction of the Triage Modelling Tool (TMT), which leverages file system
structuring behaviours to identify devices with a greater likelihood of containing investigative value.

THE TRIAGE MODELLING TOOL
The purpose of the TMT is to provide a tool that can model a file system and provide information on the
structure and sub-structures contained within it. This information can then be used in a profiling capacity to
rapidly identify areas of interest for greater scrutiny during digital triage. The TMT developed by the authors
provides a novel approach to file system model generation, improving on similar pre-existing solutions such as
the in-build Encase ‘Export Folders’ function. The model adopts an inductive profiling approach as it is most
suited to file system modelling. While deductive profiling has its merits, it is based on inferring logical
conclusions from provided case data. For example, an investigator could easily deduce that an offender is a fan
of a certain sporting team if their internet search history has numerous hits for that team. However, inferring
logical conclusions from a file system representation is nigh impossible. For an investigator or analyst, viewing a
directory and its associated subdirectories provides no immediately identifiable beneficial information.
The TMT has two components. The first component is the Text Extractor written in the proprietary Encase
scripting language, Enscript, which provides a mechanism for extracting only the minimum amount of
information required to recreate a model of a file system from the current investigation. This information is
utilised by the second component of the TMT, the File System Modeller Python script which recreates a
representation of the data originally selected from Encase. Both of these components are available for download
at:
https://github.com/AustralianCentreforCyberSecurity/Triage-Modelling-Tool
The licensing specifics are also found on the GitHub site.
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CONCEPTUALISATION
TMT is designed, in its initial stages, to assist and augment administrative triage in a laboratory environment.
Often this triage is investigator-led and conducted as a precursor to a full forensic analysis. TMT relies on the
use of existing forensic tools for integrity preservation. Its use will assist criminal investigators and forensic
analysts to direct their efforts to areas more likely to benefit them.
The second component of TMT is as the initial data creation tool in a larger, ongoing research project.
Unsupervised machine learning systems require tagged and verifiable datasets to effectively train (Pedregosa et
al., 2011). One benefit of the TMT tool is that over time, the tool will create a larger number of crime-specific
datasets that can be used as training data for future machine learning development. Once these datasets have
been obtained, there will be future research to leverage these in a field-based digital forensic triage tool.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TMT
The Text Extractor Enscript operates within Encase to maintain forensic integrity of data and allows a forensic
analyst to select individual subdirectories, an individual user’s entire home directory or an entire file system - the
amount of customisation is up to the discretion of the analyst. Once the desired file system areas to be modelled
have been selected, the Text Extractor Enscript can then be run to export the required information to the Python
script.
The Enscript works by first defining an iterator to operate on the selected files and folders from the case view.
The iterator is explicitly told not to calculate hashes of any data it extracts to increase efficiency. Once the
iterator is established, the export path is defined and built on the local machine to store the output from the
script. This location can be modified, but by default exports to the current case’s export directory.
With all selected items from the case view, the Enscript iterates through every item and extracts the full path,
name and category for each folder and file. The filename is then written to a string with the same name as the
file or folder from the case, but appended with a Globally Unique Identifier (GUID) to ensure that the integrity
of all entries remain intact and no entries with identical names are overwritten at the export location. The full
path and category of each entry are also written to a string. A file is then generated in the local machine and uses
the filename with GUID as the identifier. Finally, the text document is populated with the content from the
second string - the full path and category - before being closed. This occurs until all items have been processed
and a text file representing each file and folder has been created on the local machine.
The Python script has two major functions. The first function accepts input from the user for the file system
directory location and the expected root file’s name. This ensures the correct location for the text files exported
from Encase is correct, but also strips any unnecessary files or folders that exist above the desired root folder
from all exported files. This function then imports, reads, formats, splits and writes both lines from each text file
into a list and provides an error check for how many files were processed.
The second function also accepts two items of input - the export location for the file system model to be
generated at and the type of crime the model is most closely associated with. With this information, the function
iterates through the list generated from the previous function and creates any entry with a category of ‘Folder’.
As the list is not ordered by the root directory listing, the function also checks to ensure all parent folders have
also been created for each folder entry and creates them if needed. Once all folders have been created, the
function then iterates through the list and populates each folder with any entry with a category of ‘File’. Error
catching and correction also occurs for NTFS and Windows 7 OS compatibility issues. After this function has
finished populating the generated model with files, the script terminates.

TEST CASES
To test the required functionality of the TMT, four test cases were used. These test cases displayed the required
functionality of the TMT by modelling the entire user space for one randomly selected user from the disk image,
as well as modelling the immediate folders and files surrounding an item identified as evidence deep within the
file system. The two disk images used to conduct this analysis are outlined below (digitalcorpora.org, 2015a).



Test Case 1, 2 - nps-2008-jean.E01, Encase Image File Size: 1.464841GB (digitalcorpora.org, 2011)
Test Case 3, 4 – terry-2009-12-11-001.E01, Encase Image File Size: 10.34532GB (digitalcorpora.org,
2015b)
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The results of the test cases were measured against Encase’s inbuilt ‘Export Folders’ function. This function was
found to have the most similar functionality to the TMT and has the added benefit of being directly compatible
with the software rather than being an external plugin or Enscript.
The TMT was designed, developed and tested on a Windows 7 Enterprise SP1 64-bit Operating System. The
machine used had an Intel®Core™ i7 CPU 860@2.80GHz processor with 8GB RAM. All results were stored in
the C:\ Drive, which for a 2GB-2TB volume has a minimum allocation unit size of 4KB.
Three performance metrics were used to measure the effectiveness of the TMT against the file system modelling
Encase could produce:




Size: This refers to the total size of all files (the entire model) exported by Encase. For the TMT, size
refers to the collective size of all text files exported with the Enscript.
Size on Disk: This refers to the amount of disk segments allocated by the OS for all files exported by
Encase. For the TMT, this is the amount of disk segments allocated to store the exported text files. For
the NTFS file system format, the minimum cluster allocation size was 4KB (Microsoft, 2015).
Efficiency: This is the total time for Encase to export all folders and files. For the TMT, this is the
collective time required to run, process and then generate a file system model from both the Enscript
and Python script. For testing, the required user inputs for the Python script were predefined to ensure
accuracy.

In the table and graphs below, TMT refers to the Triage Modelling Tool and ENC refers to the Encase export
option.

Test Case 1
(User – C:/Users/Jean)
Test Case 2
(Evidence File, Custom Root:
Jean\Start Menu\Programs)
Test Case 3
(User – C:/Users/terry)
Test Case 4
(Evidence File, Custom Root:
terry\AppData\Local\Google)

Test Case Performance Metrics Comparison
Size
Size on Disk
TMT output 125.24x less
TMT output 11.26x less
(1,749KB compared to
(20,509KB compared to
219,051KB)
230,928KB)
TMT output 2.69x less
ENC output 1.28x less
(8.65KB compared to
(128KB compared to
23.3KB)
100KB)
TMT output 262.74x less
TMT output 22.51x less
(4,098KB compared to
(49,161KB compared to
1,076,700KB)
1,106,792KB)
TMT output 373.72x less
TMT output 32.47x less
(890KB compared to
(10,400KB compared to
332,607KB)
337,670KB)

Efficiency
TMT 43s faster
(11.35%)
TMT 0.795s faster
(39.75%)
TMT 17m40s
faster
(55.85%)
TMT 3m29s faster
(55.73%)

Table 1 - Test Case Parameter Comparison of Encase vs TMT

136

Size of Exported Files - KB
1200000
1000000
800000
Size ENC

600000
1076700

Size TMT

400000
200000
0

332607

219051
1749

23.3 8.65

Test Case 1

Test Case 2

4098
Test Case 3

890
Test Case 4

Figure 1 - Size of Exported Files of Encase vs TMT

Size on Disk - KB
1200000
1000000
800000
600000

Size on Disk ENC

1106792

Size on Disk TMT

400000
200000

0

337670

230928
20509

128 100

Test Case 1

Test Case 2

49161

10400

Test Case 3

Test Case 4

Figure 2 - Size on Disk of Encase vs TMT
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Efficiency - seconds
2000
1800
1600
1400
1200

1000

Efficiency ENC

1898

Efficiency TMT

800
600
838

400
200

379 336

0
Test Case 1

375

2 1.205
Test Case 2

Test Case 3

166

Test Case 4

Figure 3 - Efficiency of Encase vs TMT

Displayed in Table 1 and Figures 1-3 above, the results from each test case were promising as in 11 out of 12
performance metrics compared, the TMT performed better than the Encase function. As the minimalistic design
and implementation of the TMT only extracts what is required to rebuild the file system hierarchy, the size of
exported files and size allocated on disk is extremely scalable for larger models. For extremely small models
with files that have amounts of data that can be contained within the cluster allocation unit size for NTFS file
system formats, the exported TMT text files representing folders require a 4KB segment allocation (Microsoft,
2015), increasing the TMT model size to greater than the Encase export. In reality, these types of models would
generally have less profiling benefit. The size on disk is also only a concern between processing of the Enscript
and Python script. Once the Python script has processed all text files and rebuilt a representation of a file system
segment, these files can be deleted and the final size on disk of the model is 0 bytes. As the final model generates
folders and files with only a name as metadata, NTFS can store the entire directory listing and all metadata
within its master file table (MFT) and does not have to allocate a 4KB disk segment to any part of the generated
model (NTFS.com, 2015). Figure 4 below displays a standard entry within the MFT - all metadata can be stored
within the ‘data or index’ field of the entry.

Figure 4 - NTFS MFT Entry

As discussed, the results of the tests are promising. As a proof-of-concept, this work provides a basis for future
digital forensic profiling work.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper outlines the benefits and first stage of an inductive profiling approach for digital triage through the
use of a file system model generation tool. As a proof-of-concept implementation, the TMT has displayed
extremely positive results which encourage the continual development of the tool to encompass a greater variety
of operating systems, file system formats and forensic programs.
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The most important area of future work is the development of a file system model data store and correlation
database to support the inductive profiling approach. As file system models are generated for different types of
crime, a centralised data store with machine learning algorithms could be utilised to develop file system
templates for different crime types. These crime templates could then be used to determine the amount of
correlation between an unknown file system and the crime template database, providing a rapid means of
classifying devices in a laboratory environment.
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